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Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people
morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably
not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial
conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers
ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and
cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages.
Overall, participants tended to ascribe moral responsibility whether the perpetrator
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lacked sourcehood or alternate possibilities. However, for American, European, and
Middle Eastern participants, being the ultimate source of one’s actions promoted
perceptions of free will and control as well as ascriptions of blame and punishment.
By contrast, being the source of one’s actions was not particularly salient to Asian
participants. Finally, across cultures, participants exhibiting greater cognitive reflection
were more likely to view free will as incompatible with causal determinism. We discuss
these findings in light of documented cultural differences in the tendency toward
dispositional versus situational attributions.
Keywords: free will, compatibilism, cognitive style, situationism, dispositionism, sourcehood, alternate
possibilities
INTRODUCTION
The question of whether free will is compatible with determinism
has fueled an intricate debate among philosophers (Strawson,
1963; Frankfurt, 1969; Fischer et al., 2009), which recent scientific
work on human volition has enlivened (Dennett, 2004; Mele,
2008; Caruso, 2012). The crux of the free will problem can be
outlined succinctly: In a deterministic universe, all events are
the consequence of past events and the laws of nature. Then,
if our universe is deterministic and every human action is the
consequence of past events and the laws of nature, do people
exercise control over their behavior in the way required for
moral responsibility? Philosophical debate on this question has
clustered around two proposed conditions for free will: alternate
possibilities and ultimate sourcehood.
According to the principle of alternate possibilities, free will
and moral responsibility depend upon the ability to do otherwise.
Since determinism implies that agents could not have done
otherwise once initial conditions and the laws of nature are
held fixed, it follows that free will and moral responsibility
are incompatible with determinism. This conclusion was
challenged when philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1969) – in an
ingenious appeal to counterfactual intervention – provided
an influential argument against the principle of alternate
possibilities, illustrated in the following thought experiment:
Suppose that I want to stay home all day on Sunday to rest
for the busy week ahead. Come Sunday, I cancel my plans to
go hiking with friends. Instead, I spend the day watching a
movie, cooking a meal, and taking a long nap on the couch.
Unbeknownst to me, the door to my apartment was jammed
and I would not have been able to go hiking, or leave at all, had
I tried. In this circumstance I could not have done otherwise;
but did I freely stay home anyway? According to the principle of
alternate possibilities, I did not; but Frankfurt had the influential
insight that we should think of my behavior as being freely willed
despite my lack of alternate possibilities. Do people ordinarily
conceive of free will as Frankfurt does? Some evidence has shown
that North Americans typically agree with Frankfurt’s assessment
that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for free will or moral
responsibility (Miller and Feltz, 2011).
Determinism doesn’t merely entail the absence of alternate
possibilities. In a deterministic universe, the laws of nature
together with a complete description of the state of the
universe at time t1 entail the state of the universe at time
t2. Thus, agents never initiate the causal sequence resulting
in their behavior; rather, people’s intentions, desires, and
reasons are themselves the result of prior events. Hence,
determinism also precludes what is known as ultimate sourcehood
of one’s own acts (Pereboom, 2001): For example, if in a
deterministic universe I make a salad instead of a burger
for lunch, the causal chain of events that can be traced
back from my action does not stop at my intentions,
desires, and beliefs, but regresses to events that predate
my own existence.
The same is true of people’s achievements and crimes:
In a deterministic universe, agents may proximately cause
them, but their ultimate source traces back to the beginning
of time. Some incompatibilist philosophers view this lack of
sourcehood as undermining free will and moral responsibility
(van Inwagen, 1983; Pereboom, 2001), while some compatibilist
philosophers do not. In turn, non-philosophers have been shown
to endorse incompatibilism when given an abstract description
of a deterministic universe (Nichols and Knobe, 2007), and to
endorse compatibilism when given a concrete description of a
deterministic universe (Nahmias et al., 2005).
Thus, existing empirical evidence reveals that laypeople hold
agents morally responsible, even while acknowledging that the
agent could not have done otherwise (Miller and Feltz, 2011),
and did not originate the causal sequence resulting in action
(Nichols and Knobe, 2007). However, past studies share an
important limitation: With one notable exception (Sarkissian
et al., 2010), they have been administered only to relatively small
and homogeneous samples of respondents in the United States.
Since cultures differ considerably in their values (Hofstede
et al., 2010) and philosophical judgments (Machery et al.,
2004; Machery, 2017), whether past findings generalize across
cultures remains very much an open question. Furthermore,
given growing concerns about the replicability of key results in
experimental psychology and philosophy (Cova et al., 2018),
conducting a highly powered, cross-cultural generalization of
core findings is a timely and important enterprise. Thus, our
primary goal in this paper is to draw on a large and diverse
sample of international respondents in order to examine
intuitions regarding the conditions for free will and moral
responsibility across cultures. In addition, the present study
offers two novel contributions.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 2428
fpsyg-10-02428 November 2, 2019 Time: 13:11 # 3
Hannikainen et al. Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures
First, motivated by evidence of cultural variation in
explanatory style, we examine whether Asians and Westerners
differ in their reasoning about free will and moral responsibility.
Numerous experiments on social attribution have shown that
people typically allude to an agent’s internal characteristics, such
as her skills, desires, or personality, when attempting to explain
why and how she behaves (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985) – a
tendency known as dispositionism. For instance, when asked
to describe a medicine mix-up at a children’s hospital, many
participants say the accident happened because a particular
pharmacy worker was “careless” or “irresponsible” (Chiu et al.,
2000). Yet, a handful of comparative studies have provided
compelling evidence that dispositionism may not be universally
shared (Miller, 1984; Morris and Peng, 1994; Choi et al., 1999):
In particular, East Asians are more likely to highlight features
of the situation. For instance, when asked to describe the same
hospital incident, Chinese participants tended to attribute this
occurrence to extrinsic causes: e.g., the clinic’s failure to “assure
the quality of the medicine” or “monitor the performance of
the workers.” These differences in attributional style have been
observed in naturalistic contexts too (Morris and Peng, 1994):
When explaining a gruesome murder, an American newspaper
(The New York Times) focused more on intrinsic features,
while a Chinese newspaper (World Journal) focused more on
situational factors.
Developmental evidence on the emergence of free will beliefs
has revealed corresponding cultural differences: Between ages
four and eleven, children in the United States appear to
strengthen their belief that individuals can choose to violate
norms (e.g., to make a classmate cry), whereas Nepali children
show no such change (Chernyak et al., 2013). In comparison to
the characteristically Western sense that agents choose whether
to act on desires and social norms, Asian cultures are more
likely to treat such situational factors as direct constraints on
human behavior. Taken together, these findings suggest that
intuitions regarding the conditions for free will may be different
in Asian cultures.
Our second novel contribution is to characterize the
motivational and cognitive underpinnings of compatibilist versus
incompatibilist intuitions. Previous empirical research has shown
that, at least among Americans, extraverts are more likely to
view free will as compatible with determinism, while introverts
are more likely to see them as incompatible (Feltz and Cokely,
2009) – a pattern that holds even among philosophers with expert
knowledge about this very issue (Schulz et al., 2011).
Thus far, no research has sought to clarify why extraverts
and introverts might differ by probing into their divergent
reasoning styles – and our present study helps to fill this
gap: Leading theories of extraversion point not only to greater
interpersonal engagement, but also to differences in decision-
making style (Depue and Collins, 1999). Specifically, introverts
tend to adopt a rational thinking style (e.g., “I enjoy intellectual
challenges”), while extraversion is more associated with an
experiential thinking style (e.g., “I like to rely on my intuitive
impressions”) and a dependence on habitual over goal-directed
learning mechanisms (Pacini and Epstein, 1999; Skatova et al.,
2013). A related literature suggests that extraverts are more
reward-sensitive (Smillie, 2013), as evidenced by neuroimaging
studies of gambling behavior (Cohen et al., 2005).
These contrasting styles of information and reward processing
point to a potential explanation for the link between personality
and compatibilist judgments: While introverts may tend to
reflect more on the implications of determinism for free will,
extraverts may be more immediately motivated to punish the
perpetrator – consistent, also, with evidence that exacting third-
party punishment is rewarding (de Quervain et al., 2004). To
investigate this hypothesis, participants were asked to complete
the Cognitive Reflection Test – a performance-based measure
of individuals’ tendency to reconsider their initial intuitions
(Frederick, 2005).
In the sections that follow, we report the methods and
results of our large-scale, cross-cultural study. We end with
a general discussion that connects our findings to our two
novel contributions, and which emphasizes the importance
of our findings, and cross-cultural work more generally, for
philosophical methodology.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We invited 5,268 participants (46% women; age: Median = 26,
Min = 18, Max = 88) from 21 different locations around the world
to complete a survey as part of an international collaboration.
Supplementary Table S1 provides details regarding the
demographic profile, language, and medium of administration
for each location.
Procedure
As part of a battery of questions concerning philosophical
thought experiments, participants were randomly assigned to
read one of two hypothetical murder scenarios narrated in the
primary local language. For each site, we sought a bilingual
translator to prepare all stimuli in the local language, except
where previously validated and published translations were
already available (as noted in the section “Measures”).
Half of our participants (n = 2,381) read the “Actual Sequence”
(AS) scenario, previously employed in influential studies of moral
psychology (Nichols and Knobe, 2007; Feltz et al., 2009; Cova
et al., 2012; Rose and Nichols, 2013; Feltz and Cova, 2014; Murray
and Nahmias, 2014).1 The AS scenario opens by situating the
reader in a deterministic universe:
Imagine a universe in which everything that happens is
completely brought about by whatever happened before it.
This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so
what happened in the beginning of the universe brings about
what happened next, and so on right up until the present.
For example, 1 day John decided to have vegetable soup
at lunch. Like everything else, this decision was completely
brought about by what happened before it. So, if everything
in this universe was exactly the same up until John made his
1Due to a technical problem, the AS scenario was not administered in Colombia.
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decision, then it had to happen that John would decide to
have vegetable soup at lunch.
Thus, the first paragraph describes a deterministic universe
in which agents (a) could not have done otherwise, and (b)
are not the source of their actions. Then, the second paragraph
describes a hypothetical agent carrying out a murder in those
precise conditions:
In this universe, a man named Bill has become attracted to
his secretary, and he decides that the only way to be with her
is to kill his wife and three children. Before he leaves on a
business trip, he sets up a bomb that destroys his house and
kills his family while he is away.
A separate group of participants (n = 2,887) read a variant
of the “Counterfactual Intervener” (CI) case (adapted from
Frankfurt, 1969; Miller and Feltz, 2011) – in which the
perpetrator is the source of the murder, but happens to lack
alternate possibilities:
The year is 3072. A group of mad scientists has invented a
sophisticated device that can monitor what is going on in
a person’s mind. The device works at a distance by sending
and receiving signals from a special chip that can be easily
implanted into a person’s brain. With the device, the scientists
can change a person’s decisions to engage in specific actions
by simply sending signals to the special chip implanted in the
person’s head and thereby manipulating the activation of the
person’s neurons.
One day, the scientists had a person infiltrate a clinic to find
people so that the chip could be secretly implanted in them.
Martin is one of the subjects who receive the implant.
The next day, while monitoring Martin’s thoughts, the
scientists see that Martin is deliberating on a matter of great
concern: whether to kill his friend Adam, who is having an
affair with Martin’s wife. The scientists agree that they will let
Martin make his own decision, but that, if he decides not to
kill Adam, they will make him change his mind by sending
signals that reinforce his desire and reasons to kill Adam. In
other words, regardless of Martin’s own final decision, Martin
will kill Adam, because the scientists are set on interfering if
necessary. Martin decides to kill Adam and ends up killing
Adam. The scientists didn’t have to interfere.
Measures
This study made use of four dependent measures, presented
consecutively. Two measures assessed non-moral aspects of free
will, namely:
(1) Freedom: i.e., whether or not the agent acted freely when he
killed his victim (1: yes, 0: no), and
(2) Control: i.e., how much control he had over killing his
victim (1: no control – 7: complete control).
In two further questions, we examined whether participants
judged that the agent should be held morally responsible:
(3) Blame: i.e., to what extent he was blameworthy (1: not at
all – 7: extremely), and
(4) Punishment: i.e., how much punishment he deserved (1: no
punishment – 7: severe punishment).
At the end of the survey, participants completed two further
measures: the original (three-item) Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) and the Ten Item Personality Inventory
(TIPI; Gosling et al., 2003). The CRT is a short assessment of
participants’ cognitive style through three open-ended questions.
For instance, one question asks: “If it takes 5 machines 5 min to
make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make
100 widgets?” Many participants provide the incorrect, intuitive
answer that springs to mind, i.e., “100 min,” while others provide
the correct answer, “5 min.” As an individual difference measure
of cognitive style, we calculated:
(5) CRT score: the sum of correct answers (ranging from 0: least
reflective to 3: most reflective),
The TIPI is a short-form of the five-factor model of personality
that has been validated in several languages (Muck et al., 2007;
Oshio et al., 2012; Renau et al., 2013; Chiorri et al., 2014), yielding
a further individual difference measure:
(6) Extraversion: the two-item average on the Ten
Item Personality Inventory (1: most introverted, 7:
most extraverted).
Finally, we asked participants to provide the following
sociodemographic information: age, gender, native language,
nationality, country of residence, educational attainment,
religiosity, and political orientation.
Below we report how sample size was determined, all data
exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures relevant to the
present research question. Participants completed four additional
tasks that were unrelated to (and therefore not analyzed for)
the current study. This study was reviewed and approved by the
Institutional Review Board at the University of Pittsburgh.
Exclusion Criteria
To identify participants who failed to understand the scenarios,
we asked a comprehension question after each scenario.
Following the CI scenario, participants were asked whether the
scientists in that scenario had to interfere for the murder to take
place, and they were excluded if they (incorrectly) responded
that the scientists had to interfere. Following the AS scenario,
participants were asked whether the murder “was brought about
by whatever happened before it” and whether “it had to happen”
in a single question, and they were excluded if they (incorrectly)
responded that the murder was not brought about by whatever
happened before it and that it did not have to happen.
Nearly one in three participants (31%; n = 736) failed to
comprehend the AS scenario – in contrast to one in eight who
misunderstood the CI scenario (n = 362). That is, numerous
participants ignored or disregarded the instructions stipulating “a
universe in which everything that happens is completely brought
about by whatever happened before it,” and (incorrectly) reported
that the murderer’s decision “was not brought about by whatever
happened before it” (emphasis added).
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This difficulty in conceiving causal determinism was expected
in light of recent work on the ‘intrusion of intuitive metaphysics’
(Rose et al., 2015): namely, people’s strong conviction that the
actual world is indeterministic hinders the suspension of disbelief
required to engage in the AS scenario’s thought experiment.
On one hand, since these participants are construing
the universe as indeterministic, their responses cannot shed
light on their intuitions regarding the conditions for free
will and responsibility. Therefore, throughout the section
“Results,” we only report analyses of the subsamples who
demonstrated comprehension: 2,525 and 1,645 participants
for the CI and AS cases, respectively. At the same time,
the stark difference in comprehension rates across these
two scenarios introduces the risk of an assignment bias,
which could jeopardize the comparative analyses reported in
section “Comparative Analyses.” To address this concern, in
Supplementary Analysis 1 we provide statistical analyses for the
full samples, and find that many of our results (including our key
finding) are unchanged when we do so.
Power Analysis
We heed Benjamin et al.’s (2017) recommendation of treating
results as statistically significant if their associated p-values are
lower than 0.005 and as suggestive if they lie between 0.005
and 0.05. A power analysis for small effects (r = 0.10) with
80% power revealed a target sample size of 782 participants to
uncover suggestive evidence, and 1,325 participants to uncover a
significant effect.
Analytic Approach
Statistical analyses were performed in R 3.5.1. In section “Separate
Analyses,” we report the results for the AS and CI scenarios
separately. Then, in section “Comparative Analyses,” we report
comparative analyses of AS and CI data. In every regression
and ANCOVA model, we enter age and gender as covariates to
mitigate the impact of differences in sample composition across
countries. Unless otherwise noted, regressions and ANCOVAs
are random coefficients and slopes models, estimated using
the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2015), with participants nested
within countries. P-values for the fixed effects were calculated
using the Satterthwaite approximation in lmerTest (Kuznetsova
et al., 2017). National and regional comparisons were based
on estimated marginal means using the emmeans package
(Lenth et al., 2019), with significance levels adjusted using
the Tukey method for familywise error correction. Mediation
and moderated mediation analyses were conducted using
the mediation package (Tingley et al., 2014) and confidence
intervals were derived through 5000 quasi-Bayesian Monte Carlo
simulations (see Imai et al., 2010).
Raw data and analysis scripts are available at the following link
on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/t3gzv/.
RESULTS
Separate Analyses
Summary statistics are displayed in Table 1
and Supplementary Table 2.
The Counterfactual Intervener (CI) Scenario
Despite lacking alternate possibilities, the perpetrator was seen as
acting freely by a significant majority of participants (82%, 95%
CI [81%, 84%], binomial test: p < 0.001). Moreover, attributions
of control (M = 5.00, SD = 2.28), blame (M = 5.90, SD = 1.64), and
punishment (M = 5.99, SD = 1.44) were all significantly above the
scale midpoint (all one-sample t-test ps< 0.001). Thus, extending
prior research (Miller and Feltz, 2011), participants tended to
share Frankfurt’s (1969) intuition that alternate possibilities are
not necessary for free will and moral responsibility.
Separate ANCOVAs with site as factor revealed substantial
differences in ascriptions of control, F(20, 2375) = 12.5, η2p = 0.11,
blame, F(20, 2370) = 18.9, η2p = 0.16, and punishment across sites,
F(20, 2363) = 9.47, η2p = 0.08, all ps< 0.001, while a corresponding
logistic regression revealed differences in ascriptions of freedom,
χ2(df = 20) = 217.4, p < 0.001. To evaluate whether intuitions
varied across world regions, we repeated the above analyses
with respondents grouped by world region (rather than by
site): Asian respondents ascribed less freedom, control, blame,
and punishment than European, Middle Eastern, or American
participants, all ps < 0.005 (see Table 2). In addition, European
participants ascribed less control than either Middle Eastern or
American participants, ps < 0.001.
The Actual Sequence (AS) Scenario
In the AS scenario, participants were more divided about whether
the perpetrator acted freely (47%, 95% CI [44%, 49%]) and they
tended to deny control (M = 3.31, SD = 2.38) – with both
attributions significantly below chance/midpoint, ps < 0.005.
Still, attributions of blame (M = 4.67, SD = 2.41) and punishment
(M = 5.04, SD = 2.32) remained significantly above the scale
midpoint, ps < 0.001. Therefore, in line with previous studies
on the problem of free will (Nichols and Knobe, 2007; Miller
and Feltz, 2011), people revealed compatibilist responses to both
concrete scenarios – whether the agent was characterized as
lacking alternate possibilities or sourcehood.
Once again, one-way ANCOVAs entering site as a factor
revealed differences in perceived control, F(19, 1577) = 6.13,
η2p = 0.07, blame, F(19, 1576) = 6.65, η2p = 0.08, and
punishment, F(19, 1576) = 5.03, η2p = 0.06, while a corresponding
logistic regression revealed differences in ascriptions of freedom,
χ2(df = 19) = 86.9, all ps < 0.001.
The ANCOVAs across world regions suggested that Asians
ascribed significantly more blame and punishment than either
Middle Easterners or Europeans, ps < 0.001, but no more
freedom or control, ps > 0.20 (see Table 2). There were few
reliable differences between Europeans, Middle Easterners and
Americans (only 2 of the 12 pairwise comparisons revealed
significant or suggestive differences).
Personality and Cognitive Style
Turning to individual differences, we partially replicated
the previously reported link between extraversion and
free will judgments in the AS case (Feltz and Cokely,
2009, 2019), as shown in Table 1: Extraverts were more
likely to ascribe freedom, r = 0.09, 95% CI [0.04, 0.13],
and they attributed greater control, r = 0.11, 95% CI
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TABLE 1 | Means, standard deviations, and correlations with confidence intervals.
CI AS 1 2 3 4 5 6
M SD M SD
1. Freedom 0.83 0.38 0.47 0.50 – 0.51∗∗
[0.47, 0.55]
0.46∗∗
[0.42, 0.50]
0.44∗∗
[0.40, 0.48]
−0.16∗∗
[−0.21, −0.11]
0.09∗∗
[0.04, 0.13]
2. Control 5.00 2.28 3.31 2.38 0.31∗∗
[0.27, 0.34]
– 0.50∗∗
[0.47,0.54]
0.45∗∗
[0.41,0.49]
−0.17∗∗
[−0.22, −0.12]
0.11∗∗
[0.06, 0.16]
3. Blame 5.90 1.64 4.67 2.41 0.39∗∗
[0.36, 0.42]
0.28∗∗
[0.24, 0.31]
– 0.80∗∗
[0.78, 0.81]
−0.12∗∗
[−0.17, −0.07]
0.04
[−0.01, 0.09]
4. Punishment 5.98 1.44 5.04 2.32 0.44∗∗
[0.40, 0.47]
0.27∗∗
[0.24, 0.31]
0.64∗∗
[0.62, 0.67]
– −0.10∗∗
[−0.15, −0.06]
0.03
[−0.02, 0.07]
5. CRT score 1.43 1.19 1.56 1.21 0.04∗
[0.00, 0.08]
0.00
[−0.04, 0.04]
0.08∗∗
[0.04, 0.12]
0.09∗∗
[0.05, 0.13]
– −0.13∗∗
[−0.18, −0.08]
6. Extraversion 4.05 1.46 3.99 1.49 −0.01
[−0.05, 0.02]
0.02
[−0.02, 0.06]
0.02
[−0.02, 0.06]
−0.01
[−0.05, 0.03]
−0.06∗∗
[−0.10, −0.02]
–
M and SD represent mean and standard deviation, respectively. Values in square brackets indicate the 95% confidence interval for each correlation separately by condition:
CI (below diagonal; gray background); AS (above diagonal). ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.005.
TABLE 2 | Regression-based pairwise comparisons between world regions on each dependent measure.
CI AS
B t p B t p
Freedom∗ −1.35 −9.88 < 0.001 0.04 0.39 0.98
Asia Europe Control −0.39 −3.38 0.004 0.26 1.92 0.22
Blame −0.31 −3.73 0.001 0.81 5.97 < 0.001
Punishment −0.46 −6.35 < 0.001 0.64 4.92 < 0.001
Freedom∗ −1.17 −4.59 < 0.001 0.20 0.95 0.78
Asia Middle east Control −1.31 −6.47 < 0.001 0.11 0.45 0.97
Blame −0.72 −5.00 < 0.001 1.00 4.05 < 0.001
Punishment −0.66 −5.18 < 0.001 1.08 4.57 < 0.001
Freedom∗ −2.06 −9.94 < 0.001 −0.10 −0.67 0.91
Asia N. and S.
America
Control −0.95 −7.17 < 0.001 −0.02 −0.10 1
Blame −0.90 −9.61 < 0.001 0.34 1.89 0.23
Punishment −0.72 −8.69 < 0.001 0.28 1.61 0.37
Freedom∗ −0.18 0.69 0.90 0.15 0.74 0.88
Europe Middle east Control −0.92 −4.69 < 0.001 −0.15 −0.61 0.93
Blame −0.41 −2.97 −0.016 0.19 0.78 0.86
Punishment −0.19 −1.58 0.39 0.44 1.88 0.24
Freedom∗ −0.71 −3.25 0.006 −0.15 −0.97 0.77
Europe N. and S.
America
Control −0.55 −4.35 < 0.001 −0.28 −1.55 0.41
Blame −0.59 −6.54 < 0.001 −0.46 −2.59 0.047
Punishment −0.26 −3.20 0.008 −0.36 −2.08 0.16
Freedom∗ −0.89 −2.89 0.020 −0.3 −1.29 0.57
Middle East N. and S.
America
Control 0.36 1.72 0.31 −0.13 0.47 0.97
Blame −0.18 −1.23 0.61 −0.66 −2.40 0.077
Punishment −0.06 −0.47 0.97 −0.80 −3.05 0.013
∗coefficients for the Freedom measure are on the logit scale.
[0.06, 0.16], both ps < 0.001. However, they did not
attribute greater blame, r = 0.04, 95% CI [−0.01, 0.09], or
punishment, r = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.07], than introverts,
both ps > 0.05.
In line with prior research (Pacini and Epstein, 1999),
personality was linked to cognitive style—with extraverts scoring
lower on the CRT (α = 0.73) than introverts, r(4006) = −0.09
[−0.12, −0.06], p < 0.001. We therefore sought to understand
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whether cognitive style better predicted compatibilist judgments
than did extraversion.
Indeed, CRT scores systematically correlated with all four
attributions: More reflective participants were less likely to
ascribe freedom, r = −0.16, 95% CI [−0.21, −0.11], they
attributed less control, r =−0.17, 95% CI [−0.22,−0.13], and also
viewed the perpetrator as less worthy of blame, r = −0.12, 95%
CI [−0.17, −0.07], or punishment, r = −0.10, 95% CI [−0.15,
−0.06], all ps < 0.001 – even after controlling for differences in
extraversion.2 In sum, we successfully replicated some effects of
extraversion – but, overall, cognitive style revealed a more robust
association with judgments of free will and moral responsibility
than did personality (see also the Supplementary Analysis 1).
Comparative Analyses
The AS and CI scenarios differ in a few respects; yet, the most
salient philosophical difference concerns the question of ultimate
sourcehood (Pereboom, 2001). Neither perpetrator could have
done otherwise, but they differ with regards to sourcehood: The
perpetrator in the AS case lacks sourcehood, while the perpetrator
in the CI case is the ultimate source of his actions. Does the
presence of sourcehood promote the perception that an agent
acted freely and should be held morally responsible? To shed
light on this question, we compare responses to both thought
experiments below.
Cultural Differences
To begin with, we conducted a logistic regression (for the
dichotomous freedom measure) and two-way ANCOVAs (for the
control, blame, and punishment measures), entering scenario,
site, and the scenario × site interaction. These analyses revealed
main effects of scenario, Fs > 271, and site, Fs > 6, on all
dependent measures, all ps < 0.001. The main effect of scenario
indicated that participants were more likely to ascribe freedom
OR = 6.99, 95% CI [5.75, 8.55], and they ascribed greater control
B = 1.56, 95% CI [1.41, 1.73], blame B = 1.18, 95% CI [1.05, 1.32],
and punishment B = 0.93, 95% CI [0.80, 1.06], to the perpetrator
in the CI condition than in the AS condition, all ps < 0.001.
We also observed a scenario× site interaction in every model:
freedom, χ2(19, N = 3987) = 174.8; control, F(19, 4005) = 8.11,
ηp
2 = 0.04; blame, F(19, 3999) = 8.94, ηp2 = 0.04; and punishment,
F(19, 3992) = 7.59, ηp2 = 0.04, all ps < 0.001 – pointing toward
cultural differences in the import of sourcehood for free will.
Tests of the simple effect of scenario in each site revealed
systematic regional variation, dovetailing with previously
reported East-West differences (Miller, 1984; Morris and Peng,
1994; Choi et al., 1999): Throughout American, European, and
Middle Eastern countries, participants overwhelmingly judged
that the perpetrator in the CI case acted more freely, exercised
2When simultaneously entering both CRT scores and extraversion ratings as
predictors, we find that CRT scores predict judgments of freedom (β = −0.33,
95% CI [−0.48, −0.18], z = −4.44, p < 0.001), control (β = −0.43, 95% CI
[−0.57, −0.30], t = −6.43), blame (β = −0.27, 95% CI [−0.43, −0.11], t = −3.48,
p = 0.004), and punishment (β =−0.24, 95% CI [−0.40,−0.08], t = 3.04, p = 0.007).
Extraversion independently predicted judgments of freedom (β = 0.12, 95% CI
[0.00, 0.24], z =−1.96, p = 0.042) and control (β= 0.19, 95% CI [0.06, 0.32], t = 2.86,
p = 0.007), but not blame (β = 0.05, 95% CI [−0.08, 0.18], t = 0.79, p = 0.43) or
punishment (β = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.12, 0.17], t = 0.40, p = 0.69).
greater control, and also deserved greater blame and harsher
punishment than the perpetrator in the AS case (ps < 0.005 with
five exceptions).3
In contrast, among most Asian countries, we found no
corresponding effect of scenario: Rather, Asian participants
tended to assign comparable blame and punishment to both
perpetrators, i.e., in mainland China, Hong Kong, India,
and Indonesia, ps > 0.05. Moreover, we failed to find any
difference in judgments about whether the agent was in control
(for mainland China, Hong Kong, India, and South Korea,
ps> 0.250) or acted freely (for mainland China, Hong Kong, and
Indonesia, ps > 0.250).
A multivariate meta-analysis with site and dependent measure
as cross-classified random effects confirmed this pattern of
cultural moderation: There was substantial heterogeneity across
world regions, QM(df = 3) = 12.5, p = 006. Specifically, though no
differences emerged between Europe, North and South America,
and the Middle East, zs < 1, ps > 0.50, Asia revealed a reduced
effect across dependent measures and sites, r = −0.23, 95% CI
[−0.40,−0.06] z =−2.66, p = 0.008 (see Figure 1).
The Role of Control Across Cultures
Attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1985) predicts that
the greater tendency to hold agents with sourcehood morally
responsible (e.g., in the CI condition) arises from the perception
that the agent exercised greater control over their behavior (see
also Monroe et al., 2014; Monroe and Malle, 2019). Specifically,
the CI condition, in which the counterfactual intervener did
not have to interfere, may invite an intrinsic attribution – i.e.,
for participants to see the murderer’s actions as a reflection of
his evil character. Meanwhile, the AS case – in which behavior
is ultimately explained by antecedent causes and the laws of
nature – invites an extrinsic attribution, and the corresponding
assessment that the agent should not be held morally responsible.
To evaluate this prediction, we averaged blame and
punishment ratings to form an index of moral responsibility
(Cronbach’s α = 0.86), and tested whether attributions of control
statistically mediate the difference in moral responsibility
ascription across scenarios. As with all of our prior models, both
our mediator and outcome models incorporated age and gender
as covariates:
control = a× scenario + x1 × age + x2 × gender + i
(mediator model)
moral responsibility = b× control + c× scenario +
y1 × age + y2 × gender + i (outcome model)
We calculated the proportion of the total effect that is mediated
(i.e., prop. mediated). The total effect equals the sum of the direct
effect (expressed by coefficient c in the outcome model), and the
indirect effect via the mediator (which amounts to a × b, the
3Only five out of 56 tests revealed p-values> 0.005, a result that might be expected
by chance alone: Germany-blame p = 0.057, Germany-punishment p = 0.064. Italy-
blame p = 0.026. Switzerland-control p = 0.061. Portugal-control p = 0.020. As seen
in Figure 1, every effect trended in the predicted direction, ps < 0.10.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean ascriptions of freedom, control, blame and punishment by scenario. Observed means for each location (/site) and their 95% confidence intervals
are plotted on the x-axis. A dotted vertical line represents the scale midpoint, and world region means are displayed using solid and dashed vertical lines.
product of the effect of scenario in the mediator model and the
effect of judged control in the outcome model); therefore:
prop. mediated = ab/(ab + c)
Averaging the indirect effect estimate, ab, across 5000
Monte Carlo simulations yields the average causally mediated
effect, ACME. As expected, control attributions mediated the
effect of scenario on moral responsibility judgments among
American (n = 726; ACME = 0.72, 95% CI [0.47, 0.98]; prop.
mediated = 0.52, 95% CI [0.31, 0.98]), European (n = 1711;
ACME = 0.57, 95% CI [0.44, 0.72]; prop. mediated = 0.41, 95%
CI [0.29, 0.59]), and Middle Eastern (n = 255; ACME = 1.34,
95% CI [0.56, 2.17], prop. mediated = 0.66, 95% CI [0.43, 1.15])
participants; ps < 0.005. In each of these world regions, people
viewed the perpetrator in the CI scenario as having exercised
greater control than the perpetrator in the AS scenario. This
difference in perceived control accounted for part of the effect
of scenario on moral responsibility evaluations – as predicted by
theories of attributional reasoning.
In contrast, the mediation model failed to predict the data
obtained throughout Asian countries (n = 1302; ACME = −0.08,
95% CI [−0.01, 0.17], p = 0.092; prop. mediated = −0.11, 95%
CI [−5.57, 5.06], p = 0.86).4 This result dovetails with abundant
evidence that Asian cultures differ in their explanatory style
4Note that the proportion of the effect that is mediated can be negative when the
direct and indirect effects have opposite signs.
(Miller, 1984; Morris and Peng, 1994; Choi et al., 1999; Chiu et al.,
2000; Feinberg et al., 2019). A wide literature reveals that Asian
individuals gravitate toward situational (and not dispositional)
attributions – which could explain why they evaluate these two
crimes in a very similar way – i.e., by viewing both perpetrators
as subject to extrinsic pressures that drove them to act.
Moderated Mediation Model
As demonstrated in section “Personality and Cognitive Style,”
reflective participants ascribed less moral responsibility to the
perpetrator in the AS case. No corresponding association was
shown for the CI case – if anything, reflective participants
ascribed slightly more moral responsibility to the perpetrator,
when merely lacking alternate possibilities (see Table 1 and
Figure 2). Furthermore, the mitigating effect of cognitive
reflection emerged only among participants who grasped
determinism, whereas the associations with personality
generalized to those who misunderstood the AS scenario and
perceived the perpetrator’s behavior as causally indetermined
(see Supplementary Analysis 1).
Taken together, these results may indicate that cognitive
reflection supports the conclusion that ultimate sourcehood
is a condition for free will and moral responsibility (see,
e.g., Pereboom, 2001). Perhaps, reflective individuals are more
likely to engage in dispositionist reasoning, and ascribe control
when the agent in question is seen as the ultimate source
of her behavior.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean ascriptions by scenario and CRT score. We plot observed means for each dependent measure, grouped by location (/site) and score on the CRT.
Point size is proportional to the number of observations. A dotted horizontal line represents the scale midpoint, and linear trends by world region are displayed using
solid and dashed lines.
Indeed, reflective participants perceived a greater difference
in freedom, OR = 2.08, 95% CI [1.62, 2.67], z = 5.76, and
control, B = 0.47, 95% CI [0.30, 0.64], t = 5.42, across scenarios;
ps < 0.001.5 Meanwhile, in the same models, the interaction
between extraversion and scenario was far from significant
(freedom: OR = 0.92, 95% CI [0.77, 1.11], z = −0.88, p = 0.38;
control B =−0.14, 95% CI [−0.31, 0.04], t =−1.53, p = 0.13).
Does the greater difference in control ascriptions among
reflective participants explain why they tended to selectively
exculpate the agent in the AS scenario on measures of moral
responsibility? To assess this hypothesis, we entered CRT score
and the CRT×scenario interaction into the mediator and
outcome models defined in section “The Role of Control
Across Cultures.” We can now ask whether the magnitudes
of c (the direct effect) and ab (the indirect effect) reliably
depend on participants’ CRT score. If cognitive reflection
underlies dispositionist reasoning, we should observe that the
indirect effect via control is larger among reflective (than
unreflective) participants.
Indeed, as depicted in Figure 3, CRT score moderated the
indirect effect of scenario on moral responsibility, B = 0.13, 95%
CI [0.09, 0.17], p < 0.001. In other words, reflective individuals
5Corresponding effects emerged for blame and punishment: blame B = 0.36, 95%
CI [0.20, 0.53], t = 4.36; punishment B = 0.32, 95% CI [0.18, 0.46], t = 4.42; both
ps < 0.001.
selectively ascribed less moral responsibility to the agent in the
AS scenario than did intuitive individuals, and this effect was
mediated by differences in the degree to which they viewed the
agent as exercising control.
In several Asian countries, participants did not perceive a
difference in control across scenarios – which we interpreted in
light of their documented emphasis on situationist explanations.
Might reflection therefore play a qualitatively distinct role in
attitudes toward the free will problem in these cultural contexts?
To the contrary, even throughout Asian countries, cognitive
reflection supported incompatibilist responses to the AS case6
(freedom OR = 1.33, 95% CI [1.06, 1.67], z = 2.43, p = 0.015;
control B = 0.42, 95% CI [0.18, 0.66], t = 3.38, p < 0.001)
and moderated the indirect (ACME = 0.09, 95% CI [0.04, 0.14],
p < 0.001) effect of scenario on moral responsibility.
In sum, reflective participants ascribed less freedom
and control – and derivatively, assigned reduced moral
responsibility – to the perpetrator in the AS condition (but not
in the CI condition). This effect of cognitive reflection accounted
for previously reported associations with extraversion, and
emerged even throughout Asian cultures that tended not to
sharply distinguish the AS and CI scenarios. Importantly, failure
6Looking exclusively at Asian countries, CRT scores predicted freedom r =−0.12,
p = 0.014; control r =−0.14, p = 0.006; blame r =−0.13, p = 0.009; and punishment
r =−0.15, p = 0.004, attributions in the AS condition.
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FIGURE 3 | Moderated mediation diagram. Cognitive style moderates the indirect and direct effects of scenario on attributions of moral responsibility via perceived
control (both ps < 0.005).
to comprehend the scenarios is unlikely to explain these results,
since we excluded participants who failed our comprehension
checks in each condition.
Though not predicted by our theory, cognitive reflection also
moderated the direct effect of scenario, B = 0.28, 95% CI [0.18,
0.37], p < 0.001, perhaps because incompatibilist reasoning is
not based exclusively on assessments of agent control, but also
on constructs we did not observe in this study, such as beliefs
about the agent’s genuine or second-order desires (Frankfurt,
1969; Cullen, 2018).
DISCUSSION
At the aggregate level, we found that participants blamed and
punished agents whether they only lacked alternate possibilities
(Miller and Feltz, 2011) or whether they also lacked sourcehood
(Nahmias et al., 2005; Nichols and Knobe, 2007). Thus, echoing
early findings, laypeople did not take alternate possibilities
or sourcehood as necessary conditions for free will and
moral responsibility.
Yet, our study also revealed a dramatic cultural difference:
Throughout the Americas, Europe, and the Middle East,
participants viewed the perpetrator with sourcehood (in the
CI scenario) as freer and more morally responsible than the
perpetrator without sourcehood (in the AS scenario). Meanwhile,
South and East Asian participants evaluated both perpetrators in
a strikingly similar way. We interpreted these results in light of
cultural variation in dispositional versus situational attributions
(Miller, 1984; Morris and Peng, 1994; Choi et al., 1999; Chiu
et al., 2000). From a dispositionist perspective, participants
may be especially attuned to the absence of sourcehood: When
an agent is the source of their action, people may naturally
conjure dispositionist explanations that refer to her goals,
desires (e.g., because “she wanted a new life”) or character
(e.g., because “she is ruthless”). In contrast, when actions
result from a causal chain originating at the beginning of the
universe, explanations of this sort – implying sourcehood –
seem particularly unsatisfactory and incomplete. In contrast,
from a situationist perspective, whether the agent could be seen
as the source of her action may be largely irrelevant: Instead,
a situationist may think of others’ behavior as the product of
extrinsic pressures – from momentary upheaval, to the way they
were raised, social norms or fate – and thus perceive both agents,
in the CI and AS cases, as similar in matters of free will and
moral responsibility.
Throughout American, European, and Middle Eastern
cultures, dispositionist explanations seemed to prevail:
Participants tended to hold the perpetrator with sourcehood
morally responsible, but ascribed less moral responsibility to
the perpetrator without sourcehood – and this effect was even
larger among participants who exhibited greater cognitive
reflection. Meanwhile, consistent with past evidence (Miller,
1984; Morris and Peng, 1994; Choi et al., 1999; Chiu et al.,
2000), Asian cultures showed signs of both dispositionist
and situationist reasoning: Overall, they tended not to
distinguish between agents with and without sourcehood,
suggesting a default preference for situationist explanations.
Still, as with other world regions, reflective participants
throughout Asia were more likely to selectively exculpate
the agent lacking sourcehood. It could be that Asians tended
intuitively toward situationist explanations, but were more
likely to conjure alternative dispositionist explanations upon
further reflection.
Our study also shed new light on the understanding of
individual differences in compatibilist beliefs. Several studies
previously reported that extraverts and introverts differ in
their assessments of whether free will and determinism are
compatible (Feltz and Cokely, 2009; Schulz et al., 2011),
but yielded limited insight into why. Building on evidence
that extraverts and introverts differ in their cognitive style,
we found that a tendency toward cognitive reflection largely
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subsumed the previously reported effect of personality. This
finding helps us interpret extraverts’ and introverts’ divergent
attitudes toward the free will problem as the result of
associated differences in trait reflectivity: In the wake of a
heinous crime, we are immediately motivated to condemn the
perpetrator, prior to reasoning about whether she exercised free
will or control (Nichols and Knobe, 2007). While reflective
individuals may evaluate the implications of determinism
for free will, concluding that sourcehood (but not alternate
possibilities) is a condition for free will, less reflective
participants may readily attribute moral responsibility, and
even ascribe free will, motivated by their initial punitive drive
(Clark et al., 2014, 2017).
Limitations
First, throughout our comparative analyses we emphasized
sourcehood as the primary factor driving the difference between
scenarios. Yet, the AS and CI scenarios differed in several other
ways (e.g., the length of the vignette, the perpetrator’s motives),
which could have contributed to the greater free will and moral
responsibility ascriptions in the CI case.
Second, participants faced acute comprehension difficulties
in the AS scenario – introducing potential assignment bias
into the comparative analyses. Even though the stimuli dictated
that “everything that happens is completely brought about by
whatever happened before it,” nearly a third of participants
denied that the murderer’s decision had been brought about by
prior events. This high rate of comprehension failure has been
documented in previous studies, and attributed to overpowering
indeterministic assumptions (Rose et al., 2015) as well as to a
morally motivated denial of determinism (Clark et al., 2019). It
may also have been aggravated by the complexity with which
determinism was introduced in our vignette.
The results of our Supplementary Analysis 1 help to alleviate
both concerns. (1) The effect of cognitive reflection fully
reversed among participants who misunderstood the AS scenario:
Reflective participants who incorrectly construed the scenario as
indeterministic ascribed more free will and moral responsibility
than did intuitive participants – in line with our favored
interpretation that (perceived) sourcehood promotes attributions
of free will and moral responsibility under cognitive reflection.
(2) When re-running the comparative analyses based on scenario
assignment, regardless of comprehension, the scenario difference
in free will and moral responsibility ascriptions remained
significant – suggesting that assignment bias alone did not
produce the difference between scenarios. Still, in future research,
we aim to employ maximally matched stimuli, and pre-test
instructions that facilitate comprehension and balance exclusion
rates across conditions.
Third, because our study did not specifically measure
dispositional and situational explanatory styles, we submit
that the observed difference between Asia and other world
regions could instead be driven by other dimensions of cultural
psychology, such as individualism versus collectivism (Triandis,
1995), the prevailing self-concept (Markus and Kitayama, 1991;
Heine and Hamamura, 2007), or analytic versus holistic thinking
(Nisbett et al., 2001; Feinberg et al., 2019).
CONCLUSION
After more than a decade of research on the cognitive science
of free will, we have learned that laypeople’s beliefs vary
systematically, depending on how (Nichols and Knobe, 2007)
and who (Feltz and Cokely, 2009; Schulz et al., 2011) you
ask. Yet, prior research on judgments of free will suffered
from an important limitation: Most past studies relied on small
and homogeneous North American samples (but see Sarkissian
et al., 2010). The present work addressed this limitation by
surveying thousands of participants in twenty countries and
sixteen languages.
In so doing, our study documented individual and cultural
variations in views about the problem of free will. First, in most
world regions, people ascribe greater free will to an agent who
merely lacks alternate possibilities (in a Frankfurt case) than to
one who also lacks sourcehood (in a deterministic universe).
By contrast, being the source of one’s actions is not particularly
salient throughout Asian cultures – perhaps due to the greater
tendency toward situationist over dispositionist explanations of
behavior. Second, reflective participants were more likely to
treat ultimate sourcehood as a condition for free will, even in
predominantly situationist cultures. Importantly, the cultural
difference – i.e., between situationist and dispositionist cultures –
was not the result of variations in cognitive style. Rather, culture
and reflectivity independently contributed to lay judgments
about the conditions for free will and moral responsibility.
In closing, our findings have certain implications for
philosophical methodology: Debates about the problem of free
will have generally focused on establishing the predominant
intuition as an element in empirically informed argumentation.
Given the present evidence of substantial individual and cultural
variability, this approach seems misguided (Machery, 2017).
Clearer insights into the free will problem may instead be
gleaned by understanding the psychological and cultural bases of
disagreement concerning the tension between determinism and
free will.
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